J.L. 'S TIME BOMB STILL TICKING: HOW NAVARETTE'S NARROW HOLDING FAILED TO ADDRESS IMPORTANT ISSUES REGARDING ANONYMOUS TIPS
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The conflict is clear and the stakes are high. The effect of the rule below will be to grant drunk drivers one free swerve before they can legally be pulled over by police. It will be difficult for an officer to explain to the family of a motorist killed by that swerve that the police had a tip that the driver of the other car was drunk, but that they were powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check. I Five years ago, Chief Justice Roberts offered this emotionally charged rhetoric in dissent from the Supreme Court's refusal to review a Virginia case involving an anonymous tip of drunk: driving? The relatively new Chief Justice took issue with the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling that police must corroborate tips of drunk driving before initiating traffic stopS. 3 Chief Justice Roberts, pointing out that the Court has "repeatedly emphasized" the danger of drunk driving, urged the Court to resolve this issue, which has "deeply divided" the courtS.4 Although stopping short of implying how he would decide the issue, the language in Chief Justice Roberts's dissent left little doubt that he would favor a rule allowing police to pull over motorists who had been reported to be driving drunk without corroborating the tip. 
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See id. at 981 (" [T] he police should have every legitimate tool at their disposal for getting drunk drivers off the road.").
The controversy is rooted in the Court's apprehensive view toward anonymous tips as justification for investigatory stopS. 6 Police need "reasonable suspicion" to make an investigative stop, often called a "Terry stop,,,7 and questions arise when police base their suspicion on tips from unidentified informants. 8 Identified informants' trustworthiness and basis of knowledge can easily be evaluated based on previous dealings with police, criminal records, or a number of other "indicia of reliability,,,9 but this information is not available for anonymous tipsters. \0 Additionally, anonymous tipsters, unlike identified informants, are not subject to arrest if they make a false complaint. I I Thus, the Court has historically required police to verify the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of anonymous tips before conducting an investigatory stop,12 typically by corroborating information in the tip with first-hand police observations. 13 Requiring similar corroboration of tips reporting imminently dangerous activity such as drunk-driving would force police to wait until they observe dangerous behavior before they can do anything to stop it, "by which time it may be too late.,,14
The Court put the issue into the limelight over a decade ago, when Justice Ginsburg explained in dicta, in Florida v. JL., an anonymous tips case involving a firearms violation:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for
6.
See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,329 (1990) ("[A]n anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity inasmuch as ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations and given that the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is 'by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.'" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,237 (1983))). 7.
The Court has allowed investigatory stops based on "reasonable suspicion" since its landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968 
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In April 2014, the Court resolved the question of corroboration in Navarette v. California, a case out of California involving two brothers l7 who were pulled over by police pursuant to an anonymous tip.18 The information the tip reported was simple enough: five minutes earlier, a silver Ford F150 truck with license plate number 8D94925 had run the tipster off the road at mile marker 88, heading south on Highway 1.19 Using the information from the tip, the police were quickly able to find the Navarettes driving a silver Ford F150 with a matching plate number on Highway 1, about twenty miles from where the tipster had reported the reckless driving.20 But while the identifying information in the tip pointed the police straight to the Navarettes, the officers failed to observe any driving activity to
15.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74. J.L. involved an anonymous call to the Miami-Dade police reporting "that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun." Id. at 268. With just that information, the police went to the bus stop, saw a black teenager in a plaid shirt, and conducted a stop-and-frisk which turned up a firearm. Id. It turned out the black teenager was "10 days shy of his 16th birthday," so his possession of the firearm as a minor was illegal under Florida law. corroborate the tip's assertion that the Navarettes were driving recklessly.21
About a half hour after the tipster made the 911 call, the police had caught up to the Navarette brothers, pulled them over, and requested identification.22 During the conversation, the police officers smelled marijuana and consequently searched the truck. 23 The search uncovered four large bags of marijuana, fertilizer, hand clippers, and oven bags, which apparently led an expert at the suppression hearing to conclude that the Navarette brothers were looking to sell the drugs. 24 Based on the evidence found in the search, the Navarettes were charged with several drug crimes. 25
Pre-trial, the Navarettes moved to suppress the fruits of the search, arguing that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop because the tip "did not provide enough information about the alleged illegal driving to render the tip reliable without corroboration of illegal activity by the officers.,,26 After the brothers' motion to suppress the evidence was denied and all interlocutory appeals failed, the brothers pled guilty to transportation of marijuana and appealed the entire case until it reached the Supreme Court of the United States. 27
The specific question before the Supreme Court in Navarette was: "Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?,,28 Justice Thomas drafted a narrow opinion for the deeply divided COurt,29 avoiding some of the more pressing sub-questions that will likely continue to linger in the lower courtS. Part II of this Article argues something that the Court in Navarette completely overlooked: that corroboration is less useful when a tip reports openly observable activity than when it reports concealed crimes such as crimes of possession. When a tipster reports a crime that is not readily observable by the public-as was the case in all the anonymous tips cases the Supreme Court has decided-then corroboration is necessary to prove the tipster's personal knowledge. 38 When, however, a report of observable activity is made, a tipster's personal knowledge is much less suspect. 39 Part III of this Article explores the most mystifying omission of the Navarette decision: the balancing analysis most state courts have conducted to weigh the imminent danger posed by drunk driving against the intrusion of the Terry stop. In other words, many state courts have held that the threat of imminent danger changes the quantum of suspicion necessary to make a traffic stop "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 40 This is nothing new in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, for "exigent circumstances" have long
38.
See, e.g., Florida v. J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (holding that an anonymous tip that only provided general information about J.L. lacked sufficient reliability and corroboration by the police was insufficient because anyone in public could have provided the information; accordingly, the court held that the anonymous tip must provide predictive information about the alleged concealed criminal activity in order to allow sufficient police corroboration); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (holding that the police corroboration of the details provided by the anonymous tip provided sufficient reliability to lawfully permit the officers investigatory stop of the vehicle because the tip contained specific, predictive information about the defendant's concealed criminal activity been held to justify even the most intrusive of searches,41 and the Supreme Court has already relaxed Fourth Amendment principles when drunk driving is involved. 42 Shockingly, the Court in Navarette avoided this discussion altogether. This Article concludes that by neglecting to address the issues associated with insider information and the dangers of drunk driving, the Court in Navarette missed an opportunity to effectively close the book on anonymous tips, leaving many questions unresolved.
I. OBSERVATIONAL RELIABILITY
Judge Kelsey's framework first explains that certain reports should be analyzed based on their content and the circumstances under which the reports were made. 43 Judge Kelsey calls this an inquiry into "observational reliability" because it gives weight to the details of the report rather than the "personal reliability" of the tipster.
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This commonsense principle flows from the obvious inability of police to validate the personal trustworthiness of an anonymous informant and a policy of encouraging "disinterested," "publicspirited" citizens to quickly report crimes and other dangerous situations. 45 While a paid informer or one who seeks immunity for his reports is inherently unreliable, and should be presumed as such, ordinary tipsters have no such discrediting characteristics and should not be treated with the same scrutiny merely because they decide to not leave their name with the police. 46 Rather, an anonymous tip made during or shortly after the commission of a crime witnessed by the tipster ought to be evaluated primarily by analyzing the details of the tip, not the personal characteristics of the tipster.
The Court in Navarette recognized this, noting that contemporaneous eyewitness reports have "long been treated as especially reliable.,,47 Indeed, this is a principle with deep roots in the common law, and a number of other courts have relied on it to justify Terry stops conducted pursuant to anonymous tips.48 Given the Court's recent tendency to cite legal history in its constitutional opinions,49 it is unsurprising that Justice Thomas would invoke this deep history to support the holding that contemporaneous eyewitness reports are inherently reliable. 50 Yet, given the brevity of the majority's discussion and the vigor of the dissent in Navarette, it is worthwhile to examine the roots of this concept. In the first place, the report at the moment of the thing then seen, heard, etc., is safe from any error from defect of memory of the declarant. Secondly, there is little or no time for calculated misstatement, and thirdly, the statement will usually be made to Vol. 44 English courts echoed the rule in Thompson for over a century, 58 and it even made its way into a United States Supreme Court ruling almost two hundred years later. 59 But the present sense impression concept-and the hearsay rule itself-remained "unsettled at the tum of the eighteenth century.,,60 As the concept took shape, it eventually acquired the name: res gestae or, in the singular, res gesta.
61
For some time in England, res gestae evaded concrete definition. 62 Literally translated "things done,,,63 res gestae was a term used to describe all the central facts and circumstances surrounding the event or transaction in a case. 64 Courts admitted the entire res gestae, including hearsay statements, based on several rationales. 65 Some statements were admitted because they were an integral part of the event or transaction. 66 Today, such declarations are generally considered statements of "legally operative fact" and outside the hearsay rule entirely.67 Other statements were admitted because they were "made at the same time with the thing which it imports" and another (the witness who reports it) who would have equal opportunities to observe and hence to check a misstatement. This second type of res gestae laid the foundation for the present sense impression hearsay exception. 69
Res gestae eventually made its way into American courts and "was used here in an extraordinary variety of situations to allow the admissibility of out-of-court statements and other evidence.,,7o After years of inconsistent usage, renowned American evidence scholar James Bradley Thayer undertook to clarify the meaning of res gestae and its usefulness as a rule of evidence, with his work culminating in a "brilliant,,71 three-part article on the topic.72 Thayer's research sprang from the controversy sparked by an 1880 English homicide case in which the judge excluded the statements of the victim, made shortly after her throat was slit, because "it was not part of anything done, or something said while something was being done, but something said after something done. ,>7) This ruling spawned controversy in the legal community and even prompted the trial judge to compose and publish a defense of his ruling, which Thayer addressed thoroughly. 74 Having given clarity to the nature of contemporaneous eyewitness reports, Thayer's work has been described as the "first careful definition of the [present sense impression] exception by an American. ,,75
It was Thayer who first articulated the two types of res gestae used by the COurtS. 76 According to Thayer, the principle behind the second type of res gestae-the type that birthed the present sense impression exception-"has always existed.'>77 The reasoning behind admitting this type of res gestae is that it "takes notice of one of these strong elements of authenticity, contemporaneousness.,,78
Thayer's work was followed-up by his student, Edmund Morgan, who, over forty years later, "attempted, in a law review article which matched his mentor's in perceptivity, to revive the Thayer formulation of the present sense impression exception.,,79 When the American legal profession was drafting the model rules of evidence in the mid-1900s, Morgan became known as the "leading advocate of the [present sense impression] exception. ,,80 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were unveiled, Morgan was credited by the Advisory Committee on the Rules for outlining the elements and "underlying theory" of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1).81
Res Gestae in its Modern Form: FRE 803(1) -The Present Sense Impression
After centuries of ,confusing and inconsistent precedent, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence gleaned a handful of important principles from the common law concept of res gestae, many of which are contained in Rule 803, entitled "Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available as a Witness.,,82 Section 803 is especially helpful when considering the reliability of anonymous tips, as those exceptions flow from the theory that "under appropriate circumstances a ... statement may possess circumstantial guarantee~ of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant. ,,83
Of the 803 exceptions, the "present sense impression" exception in Rule 803(1) is probably the most instructive-it being based largely on the principle that contemporaneous observations are more reliable The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining ail event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. 85 Thus, on its face, Rule 803(1) recognizes the value of statements that describe events when those statements are made contemporaneously with the event (or shortly thereafter) and with personal knowledge of the event.
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The Advisory Committee Notes on FRE 803(1) explain that "[t]he underlying theory of [the present sense impression] exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. ,,87 This is so because as time passes, the likelihood increases that a witness of an event will fabricate a new story or the witness's memory will be distorted. 88 Other commentary on the rule indicates that the elements of the present sense impression exception are designed "[t]o assure trustworthiness," and that the contemporaneity of the statement is "perhaps [the] most significant[]" factor in determining whether a statement is reliable. 89 As such, the present sense impression hearsay exception is a great illustration of why contemporaneous reports are presumptively reliable.
90
Of course, not all contemporaneous eyewitness reports are sufficiently reliable. Notably, the Advisory Committee Notes on FRE 803 express apprehension toward anonymous declarants: "when [a] declarant is an unidentified bystander, the cases indicate hesitancy
84.
See id. III. PUBLIC DANGER Judge Kelsey's final factor to consider when analyzing anonymous tips is the "seriousness of the danger posed by the alleged illegality."ll3 When a tip reports activity that presents imminent danger to the public, the amount of corroboration necessary 1,0 constitute reasonable suspicion ought to be diminished. The fundamental justification for this principle lies in the text of the Constitution itself; the Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures.
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
See id.
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114 Reasonableness is, of course, a fluid concept, but it seems clear that searches and seizures are more reasonable when conducted to prevent an imminent threat to the public. liS Relatedly, searches and seizures are more reasonable when they are limited in scope so as to minimize invasion of privacy. 116 In short, to investigate imminently dangerous activity such as drunk driving, police may act on less evidence, so long as the investigation is limited in scope.
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In fact, the Supreme Court has already applied this type of balancing test in another case involving drunk driving, I 18 In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court upheld a sobriety checkpoint program because "the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program.,,1l9 Central to the Court's holding was the "magnitude of the drunken driving problem" and the Vol. 44 "slight[ ness]" of the inconvenience imposed by the checkpoints. l2O Notably, ten years later the Court struck down checkpoints where there was no imminent threat to the public, reasoning that without an imminent danger the normal reasonable suspicion standards cannot be altered. 121
Courts that have upheld stops of drunk drivers based on anonymous tips have almost always included some sort of balancing test, weighing the danger posed by drunk drivers against the intrusion of a stop. 122 And courts that have struck down traffic stops based on tips of drunk driving have largely ignored the impact that the threat of imminent danger has on reasonable suspicion analysis,123 leading to Chief Justice Roberts's grave concerns over the tenability of such an approach. 124 Unfortunately, in an effort to avoid thorny issues in favor of a narrow holding, the Court in Navarette ignored the question of whether tips of drunk driving require a lesser quantum of suspicion to justify a stop. Thus, the Navarette opinion will be of little help to the lower courts that will undoubtedly continue to face arguments by prosecutors that short traffic stops are justified by the serious threat implicated by drunk driving. accepted. l26 Still, in its attempt to craft a narrow opinion, the Court missed an opportunity to give lower courts some much needed guidance when it neglected to hold that (1) reports of openly observable crimes are more reliable than tips of concealed crimes, and (2) police need a lesser quantum of suspicion to justify stops when acting pursuant to tips of dangerous activity such as drunk driving.
CONCLUSION
The Court's failure to address the level of suspicion necessary to stop reportedly drunk drivers is particularly strange because it leaves unanswered JL. 's hypothetical question:
"[whether] the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability."l27 Indeed, much of the scholarship and commentary has centered on "whether anonymous tips about reckless or drunken driving should be treated differentiy."l28 And courts that have considered the issue have held that the level of danger implicated by an anonymous tip should at least be a factor of the analysis. l29 Judging by the number of times he mentioned it at oral argument, it seemed the Navarettes' appellate counsel was also convinced that this important sub-issue would be decided by the Court.l30 But the Court in Navarette ignored the issue completely.
Importantly, recognizing the factors mentioned by this Article would not render all anonymous tips of drunk driving reliable, so the potential for fraud by tipsters and police officers l3l under this Vol. 44 approach would be limited. For example, a tip from a motorist who observes a reckless driver but does not notify police until he or she returns home from a long drive would need more corroboration than the tip in Navarette, since the report would not be contemporaneous with the crime itself Similarly, a tip from a conscientious college student who noticed that his drunken friend's car was no longer outside the fraternity would not justify a stop of the car if found, since the tipster would lack personal knowledge. In other words, a comprehensive view of anonymous tips does not create an exception to the notmal rules; it simply allows courts to recognize that corroboration is not the only form of tip validation and to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion. 132 By recognizing that contemporaneous eyewitness reports are reliable, the Court took one step toward closing the book on anonymous tips jurisprudence.
But by neglecting other considerations, such as the concealed-open crime distinction and the dangerous nature of drunk driving, the Court has left many questions unanswered. The time bomb mentioned in JL. is still ticking.
warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 333 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 132. The biggest test of the value of this approach in balancing the need to safeguard the public from danger against citizens' right to privacy would be a tip of a concealed, dangerous crime not contemporaneously observed by the tipster. For example, a tip reporting that someone is carrying a bomb in the trunk of a car would lack the inherent. reliability of a contemporaneous eyewitness report and would require proof of insider information because of the concealed nature of the activity. Such a tip would force the Court to decide whether danger alone can overcome the requirement that anonymous tips be verified.
